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Who Meets Whom: Access and Lobbying During the Coalition Years 
 
Introduction 
There is a venerable tradition within political analysis of studying actors who seek to influence 
policy-makers. From interest groups to think tanks, lobbyists to professional networks, the literature 
has categorised a diversity of different actors and theorised about the distinctions ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞƌƐ ?
ĂŶĚ  ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌƐ ? ? ŝƌŽŶ ƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞƐ ? ƉŽůŝĐǇ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ĂŶĚ ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƐ  ?ĞĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ?Rhodes and 
Marsh, 1992; Smith, 2009; Gais et al., 2009). Much of this work has come in two forms. On the one 
hand, there is a rich, empirically informed literature that discusses the systemic form and activities 
of these bodies. Denham and Garnett (1996) have studied the nature and impact of think tanks in 
Britain. Baumgartner and Leech (2001) have examined patterns of interest group involvement in US 
politics and Baumgartner et al. (2009) have traced the relationship between lobbying and policy 
change. On the other hand, there is a plethora of detailed case-studies that explore how particular 
groups in particular policy areas have interacted with the machinery of government. Somerville and 
Goodman (2010) have, for example, studied the role of networks in informing migration policy, 
Hawkins et al. (2012) have examined the influence of the alcohol industry on UK health policy, and 
Hacker and Pierson (2002) have explored the influence of business on the formation of American 
welfare policy.  These traditions of study have provided key insights into the operation and influence 
of different groups and yet they have tended to deliver either systemic level analyses concentrated 
on one type of actor (i.e. studies of interest groups or lobbying organisations), or more detailed, case 
study accounts of influence. Less common are synoptic studies across government detailing 
comprehensive informal access via meetings with ministers, rather than access via inputs to party 
political, legislative and consultation procedures. 
Against this background, we present a new study of governmental access in the UK that 
draws on systematic data covering over 6,000 ministerial meetings released by the Coalition 
government between 2010 and 2015. Building on initial work undertaken by Labour, the Coalition 
government established access to a wide range of new sources of government information (Institute 
for Government, 2015). Indeed, in 2016, the UK was judged to be the world-leader in the provision 
of open data (Open Data Barometer, 2016). In this paper, we focus upon data released by the 
Coalition government relating to the meetings held between ministers and representatives of 
outside interests. This data, published on a quarterly basis on departmental websites, allows a new 
perspective on debates around ministerial access and what Weiler and Brändli (2015) ĐĂůů  ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞƌ
lobbying ?. To date, this information about meetings has provided occasional fodder for newspaper 
stories on the access achieved by business interests in general and by media barons such as Rupert 
Murdoch in particular (see Ball et al., 2011 and Martinson and Rawlinson, 2015 for examples). It has 
also been used, in a limited manner, by charities and non-governmental organisations to highlight 
trends in access.
i
 Within this paper we present the first systematic analysis of this dataset, using it to 
show which interests get access to which ministers; resulting patterns of equality and inequality in 
access to ministers; and the existence of distinctive policy communities between interests and 
ministers in specific departments. 
A key concept within the paper is access. ĐĐĞƐƐ ŝƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ŚĞƌĞ ĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇ ŽĨ
contacts between interest organisations and  ? ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?  ?ŝƐŝŶŐ ?  ? ? ? ? P 331) and is measured in 
terms of the number of meetings with ministers. Within the existing literature it is common to find 
access used as a measure for influence. Dur and De Bièvre (2007), for example, have studied access 
to meetings of the European Union Civil Society Dialogues on this basis and Chubb (1983), Langbein 
(1986) and Bailer (2010) also suggest that access can be used as a proxy for influence. We are, in 
some respects, wary of such claims and do not want to be seen to be suggesting that higher access is 
always and everywhere an indicator of higher influence. Indeed, at one point we suggest that the 
large number of meetings ministers held with the representatives of banks between 2010 and 2015 
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may be a measure not of their political strength but of their vulnerability. Yet, at the same time, 
patterns of access clearly do matter and are related to influence. There are two parts to our 
argument here. First, ministers have a limited amount of time and so, with the assistance of senior 
civil servants, and via their diary secretaries, must decide which groups to meet (Weiler and Brändli, 
2015: 747). The resulting patterns of access can, thereby, tell us something about the importance 
ministers attach to meeting with particular groups. One reason ministers may think it important to 
meet with a group is that they judge that group to be an influential one they must at the very least 
listen to. Second, meetings give interest-groups a gilt-edged opportunity to persuade ministers of 
the merits of their case (REFERENCE REMOVED). Meetings are, in this sense, not simply a measure of 
influence but a source of influence. Ministers may of course choose not to accept the arguments 
being put to them by interest-groups during meetings. On occasions, they may even decide to meet 
with an interest-group in order to create the impression of wanting to be seen to listen to their 
views even though, in reality, they have already decided on a particular course of action. Yet, 
interest-groups do, nevertheless, continually push to achieve access to ministers and it is reasonable 
to think that they do so because they believe that meetings will give them a chance to frame policy 
discussions and prime particular arguments.  
 This paper proceeds in four sections. First, we describe how we collected and coded data on 
a total of 6,292 meetings between the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretaries-of-
State in sixteen departments with outside interests. This dataset  W which wiil be made publicly 
available at the point of publication through [WEBSITE ANONYMISED] - offers an important 
foundational contribution to studying ministerial meetings. In the second part of the paper we 
describe broad patterns of access to ministers across the whole of government. We do not seek to 
test particular hypotheses about access or, more generally, arguments about the relationship 
between access and changes in the policy agenda or content of policy. The significance of the paper 
should be understood primarily in terms of the value of the data underlying it and, in particular, the 
fact that it has not previously been collated. In the third part of the paper we describe some of the 
distinctive patterns of access particular departments have with external groups. In the conclusion, 
we point to areas of further research with the database, in particular the lack of engagement with 
European and other international actors. In particular, we compare findings with the European 
Union (EU)  ‘/ŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇtĂƚĐŚ ?ǁĞďƐŝƚĞ ? which maps ministerial meetings in the European Commission 
with similar actors. This emphasises the importance of business as a key lobbying actor, supporting 
our national level findings. 
 
 
1. Ministerial Meetings Database 
 
dŚĞ ƌĞůĞĂƐĞ ŽĨ ĚĂƚĂ ŽŶ ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂů ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ ĨŝŶĚƐ ŝƚƐ ƌŽŽƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
response to the previous Labour government. The Labour administrations of Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown endured a number of scandals relating to access and lobbying culminating, shortly before the 
2010 election, in the revelation that a number of former ministers were offering their services as 
ƉĂŝĚůŽďďǇŝƐƚƐ ?^ƚĞƉŚĞŶǇĞƌƐǁĂƐƐĞĐƌĞƚůǇĨŝůŵĞĚĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐŚŝŵƐĞůĨĂƐďĞŝŶŐůŝŬĞĂ ‘ĐĂďĨŽƌŚŝƌĞ ?ǁŚŽ
had exploited his personal relationships with Lord Adonis and Lord Mandelson, the Transport 
Secretary and Business Secretary, to further the interests of National Express and Tesco (Lefort, 
2010). The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats argued that incidents such as this were emblematic 
ŽĨĂĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ĐƌŽŶǇŝƐŵ ? ?WŽƌƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞŝŶĐŽŵŝŶŐŽĂůŝƚ ŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌůĞǀĞůƐ
of transparency in government and, as one part of this commitment, the Cabinet Office, shortly after 
the 2010 election, announced that departments would, in future, be required to collect and publish, 
ŽŶ Ă ƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ďĂƐŝƐ ? ĚĞƚĂŝůƐ ŽĨ ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ? ŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐ ƚƌĂǀĞů ?ŐŝĨƚƐ ĂŶĚ ŚŽƐƉitality and meetings with 
outside interests.   
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 In the case of outside meetings, departments publish details of meetings held by ministers, 
junior ministers and, in the case of many but not all departments, personal private secretaries and 
permanent secretaries. Data has been published on a quarterly basis and lists the dates of meetings, 
who the meetings were with and the purpose of the meeting. The data we report on here relates to 
a total of 6,292 meetings held by the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for the 
Cabinet Office, the Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary and 13 other Secretaries-of-State. Table 1 lists 
the departments we have studied, the names and party affiliations of the relevant ministers and the 
number of meetings reported to have occurred between May 2010 and March 2015. What is 
immediately striking here the variation in the number of meetings held by each department. The 
average number of meetings was 377. The largest number of meetings were held by the Secretary of 
State for the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (670 meetings), the Chancellor (646 
meetings) and the Prime Minister (609 meetings). The fewest number of meetings were recorded by 
the Foreign Secretary (117 meetings), the Justice Secretary (140 meetings) and the Secretary of State 
for Defence (106 meetings). 
 
How can we account for these differences in the number of meetings? There are a range of 
possibilities. On the one hand, variations could be an accurate representation of differences across 
government and so be revealing of differences in the extent to which departments are willing to 
grant access. On the other hand, these differences might reflect shortfalls in the quality of the data 
provided by departments and so reveal the existence of challeŶŐĞƐŝŶŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
transparency program. It is certainly the case that internal documentation from the Cabinet Office 
(2014) reveals a struggle to establish best practice in transparency reporting and that previous 
studies have pointed to differences in the willingness of staff within departments to implement 
policies relating to open access and transparency (Zuiderwijk and Janssen, 2014). We also know that 
particular departments have not posted data on meetings for particular periods (see the note at the 
end of Table 1). Such possibilities suggest that publicly available data may not fully capture the 
number of meetings which occurred. 
 
Table 1: Meetings with Outside Interests: Departments, Ministers and Party Affiliation, June 2010 
ʹ March 2015. 
 
Department Ministers Party affiliation Number of 
meetings 
declared 
Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills 
Vince Cable (2010-15) Liberal Democrat 670 
Treasury George Osborne (2010-15) Conservative 646 
WƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐKĨĨŝĐĞ David Cameron (2010-15) Conservative 609 
Department for Transport Philip Hammond (2010-11) 
Justine Greening (2011-12) 
Patrick McLoughlin (2012-15) 
Conservative 607 
Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport 
Jeremy Hunt (2010-12) 
Maria Miller (2012-14) 
Sajid Javid (2014-15) 
Conservative 585 
Minister for the Cabinet 
Office and Paymaster 
General 
Frances Maude (2010-2015) Conservative 407 
Department for Education Michael Gove (2010-14) 
Nicky Morgan (2014-16) 
Conservative 344* 
Department of Health Andrew Lansley (2010-12) Conservative 330* 
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*Denotes missing data. Certain Departments did not have available data for this entire time period. 
Exceptions to note are: (1) the Department of Energy and Climate Change (May 2010- March 2012); 
(2) Department for Education (May 2010  W December 2010); (3) Department of Health (May 2010- 
June 2011); (4) Ministry of Justice (May 2010- June 2011; in addition (5) the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs lacked data for the period (April-June 2012). 
The data provided by government departments allows us to identify the organisations which 
achieved the most access to the most senior ministers in government. We also wanted, more 
generally, to see what levels of access were secured by different kinds of organisation. On this basis, 
we coded each of the participants in each of the 6,292 meetings as belonging to one of the 21 
categories of organisation listed in Table 2.
ii
 Note that the coding categories here are ordered so as 
to distinguish between 12 major kinds of organisation. Within this, however, we distinguish, in the 
case of business (code 1), the third sector (code 2), education (code 3), the media (code 5) and 
international bodies (code 13) a number of sub-categories.  
The coding system employed reflects  W like all coding systems  W the research interests of 
those who devised it as well as the nature and limitations of the data being coded. Our coding 
scheme was inductively generated rather than being deduced from a prior set of theoretical 
categories. We chose a small set of basic categories to start out  W business, third sector, trade 
unions, the media, and so on which are often employed in academic discussions of interest-group 
influence  W and then added new coding categories when it was appropriate to do so. As we 
ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚĞĚ ?ǁĞĂůƐŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂŶĞǁƐĞƚŽĨĐŽĚŝŶŐ ‘ƌƵůĞƐ ?ĨŽƌƉůĂĐŝŶŐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŽŶĞĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ
rather than another and, where necessary, re-coded existing work accordingly. This inductive 
approach was employed because there was, in our judgment, no prior set of coding categories which 
we could have adapted for our purposes. Existing studies provide a theoretically rich set of 
categories. These include, for example, ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ĐĂƵƐĞ ? Žƌ  ‘ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶĂů ? ŐƌŽƵƉƐ  ?<ůƺǀĞƌ ?
2012), specific verses diffuse interests (Kollman, 1998) and corporate versus public interest groups 
(Binderkrantz, 2008). Budge et al. in The New British Politics (2007) distinguish between interest 
groups, cause groups, new social movements, episodic groups, fire brigade groups, peak 
Jeremy Hunt (2012-15) 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government 
Eric Pickles (2010-15) Conservative 309 
Department for 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Caroline Spelman (2010-12) 
Owen Patterson (2012-14) 
Elizabeth Truss (2014-15) 
Conservative 299* 
Department for 
International Development 
Andrew Mitchell (2010-12) 
Justine Greening (2012-15) 
Conservative 287 
Department for Energy and 
Climate Change 
Chris Huhne (2010-12) 
Edward Davey (2012-15) 
Liberal Democrat 266* 
Home Office Theresa May (2010-15) Conservative 214 
ĞƉƵƚǇWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ
office 
Nick Clegg (2010-15) Liberal Democrat 203 
Department for Work and 
Pensions  
Iain Duncan-Smith (2010-15) Conservative 148 
Ministry of Justice Kenneth Clark (2010-12) 
Chris Gayling (2012-15) 
Conservative 140* 
Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office 
William Hague (2010-14) 
Philip Hammond (2014-15) 
Conservative 117 
Ministry of Defence Liam Fox (2010-11) 
Philip Hammond (2011-14) 
Michael Fallon (2014-15) 
Conservative 106 
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associations, insider groups, outside groups or crossbench groups. The Comparative Policy Agendas 
Project which documents and measures changes in the policy agenda (the set of issues to which 
political actors are, at any given time, paying serious attention) uses a set of codes distinguishing 
between different functional areas of policy-making: macroeconomics, education, health, defence 
and so on to code material (Dowding et al., 2016). Whilst theoretically rich, these distinctions were 
too rigid to capture the variety of organisations found in our dataset. Coding all of the organisations 
on the basis of one of these schemata would have also required us to undertake a detailed 
investigation of each outside interest to determine whether it could be best classified as, for 
example, a cause group or a sectional interest or, in the case of the Policy Agendas Project codes, as 
operating primarily in the area of defence policy rather than health policy. 
Where our coding scheme does coincide with existing usages, the EU Integrity Watch website 
(http://www.integritywatch.eu) provides a very similar effort at classifying political meetings. Based 
on data made available by the European Commission, it maps all meetings by European 
Commissioners by types of organisation met. This covers corporate actors, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), think tanks, churches, local government and consultants. Our coding covers a 
broader range of organisations, but it does provide some opportunities for comparison (see 
Conclusion). 
 
Table 2: Coding Categories 
Code Form of 
organisation 
Explanatory notes and examples 
1 Business Private sector and profit-making organisations including overseas-
registered firms. We used the on-line register maintained by Companies 
House to distinguish between for-profit business not-for-profit social 
enterprises. Large media companies like News International have been 
coded under the category of media.  
Available sub codes: 
1a) Banks and financial services 
1b) Arts businesses: We listed arts organisations like The National 
Theatre, the National Gallery and the Barbican as arts businesses rather 
than as social enterprises and coded the organisation Which? as a 
business. 
2 Third sector 2a) Non-profit charities and cause groups dedicated to promoting a 
particular cause. We included bodies promoting parts of the country as 
tourist destinations. 
2b) Social enterprises which operate on a for-profit basis but whose 
primary purpose is to promote the welfare of a particular group of people 
as either employees or customers. 
2c) Co-operatives operating on a for-profit basis but with an interest in 
promoting cooperatives as a form of organisation. 
2d) Religious leaders, churches or groups promoting an interest or cause 
distinguished by their religious basis. 
3 Education 3a) Meetings with Universities or particular research centres within a 
university  
3b) Named academics or groups of academics working in universities. 
3c) Publicly funded (state) schools 
3d) Privately funded (independent) schools 
4 Think-tanks Non-profit and non-university affiliated organisations conducting and 
seeking to disseminate the results of research with a view to influencing 
the policy-making process. 
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Note: during data collection we included codes for specialist lobbying firms (7), other UK state bodies (12) and 
schools (15). These are not included in the final coding categories as there were either no results (7) or the 
code was merged with another to more accurately reflect the group of actors we aimed to capture (15 merged 
with 3 and 12 merged with 8). We have kept the original coded numbers to ensure data transparency. 
  
Before describing the results of our analysis, it is important to recognise limitations in the 
data we have collected. First, and most obviously, the data only relates to a particular period in 
British politics. We cannot use the data to draw any general conclusions about how patterns of 
access have changed over time as a result of, for example, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats 
replacing Labour in office or particular issues assuming a more prominent role within the policy 
agenda. Second, our data does not include details of meetings held by junior ministers or senior civil 
servants with outside interests. It also does not incorporate details of meetings held by the 
Department of the Attorney-General or the Departments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Third, the data only covers  ‘ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ?meetings held by ministers in their department. It cannot tell us 
5 The media 5a) Private media organisations (privately owned media e.g. The 
Guardian, the Telegraph) 
5b) Public media organisations (the BBC, Channel 4) 
* We coded meetings held with major media organisations such as News 
International under this heading. 
6. Unions Organised associations of workers in a trade, group of trades or 
profession, formed in order to protect and further the interests of 
employees. 
*We coded the National Farmers Union and the British Medical 
Association as examples of unions. 
8.  Quangos and 
other UK 
state bodies 
Non-departmental public bodies funded through tax revenue which are 
not a part of the system of local government. Examples include Quangos 
such as the Civil Aviation Authority, The Charity Commission and the 
National Audit Office and other governmental bodies such as the 
Metropolitan Police, the NHS National Alliance and the Bank of England. 
9 Local 
government 
Meetings held with representatives from UK Parish, City, County or 
regional levels of government, City Mayors and the Local Government 
Association. 
10 Individuals Individuals who are either unaffiliated to any particular organisation or 
attending the meeting independently of that affiliation. Also, 
representatives of particular groups of consumers, citizens, tenants, or 
service-users who are not named individuals and are not presented as 
representatives of a particular named organisation.  
11 Miscellaneous Either meetings where the description of who attended the meeting was 
not sufficient to identify the organisation or where the organisation did 
not clearly fit into one of the other categories (examples including the 
Conservative Friends of Israel and the Aircraft Carrier Alliance: the latter a 
public-private partnership).  
13 International 
bodies 
13a) Foreign governmental bodies such as Ambassadors and High 
commissioners 
13b) Transnational non-governmental bodies such as FIFA, the 
Commonwealth War Graves Commission and the European Investment 
Bank. 
14 Professional 
Associations  
Non-profit organisations seeking to represent the interests of a particular 
profession and the interests of the individuals engaged in it. Examples 
include the Bar Council, the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Royal 
College of General Practitioners and the British Veterinary Association. 
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anything about the frequency or nature of meetings held by ministers in office corridors, at party 
conferences or at social events and dinner parties. Finally, the data we have collected cannot tell us 
anything much  W if anything  W about why a meeting was held; what was discussed at that meeting; 
and what was finally agreed. Departments are required to declare the purpose of the meetings held 
with outside interests. They have however learnt to fulfil this requirement in the most limited way 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ P ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ŽĨ ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ‘ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ? Žƌ ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ Ă
 ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? ?WƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐĚĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨǁŚŽŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞŵĞƚǁŝƚŚŚĂƐůĞĚƚŽŐƌeater transparency, 
but it is a small step forward from a low base. As the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts, 
Margaret Hodge (2012), has argued, information about ministerial meetings has not been released 
ŝŶĂǁĂǇƚŚĂƚŝƐ ‘ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞ ?ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĂŶĚ ĞĂƐǇƚŽƵƐĞ ? ? 
 
 
2. Patterns of Access 
 
Ministers held 6,292 recorded meetings with outside interests between May 2010 and 
March 2015: an average of around six meetings each working day. A majority of these meetings 
(5,211) were held with representatives from just one kind organisation. The rest were held with 
representatives of more than one group. Table 3 lists the organisations which were present at the 
largest number of meetings.  The list is dominated by meetings with journalists and with businesses 
or the key business peak organisation the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). What is perhaps 
most striking about the number of meetings held by these organisations is just how little access they 
had. The CBI attended more meetings than any other organisation and held meetings with every 
single senior minister apart from the Secretary of State for Health. This is an impressively high level 
of access. Yet, at the same time, it is worth noting that the CBI only attended, in total, around 2.5% 
of the meetings held by ministers. Indeed, the ten organisations listed in Table 3 between them only 
attended 14% of the meetings held by ministers. The market for access is actually, in this respect, 
quite fragmented with no single organisation or set of organisations holding a dominant position.  
 
Table 3. Ten Organisations with the Highest Levels of Recorded Access 
Organisations 
Number of Meetings 
Confederation of British Industry:   
158 
Journalists, editors or the owner of the Daily Telegraph / Sunday Telegraph:   
131 
Journalists, editors or executives at the BBC: 
124 
Journalists or editors at the Times / Sunday Times: 
89 
Trade Unions Congress 
82 
BAE Systems: 
78 
Shell (including the Shell Foundation) 
64 
Journalists, editors of the owners of the Daily Mail / Mail on Sunday: 
62 
Journalists, editors or the owner of the Evening Standard: 
60 
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 When we switch from looking at the access achieved by specific organisations to looking at 
the access achieved by different kinds of organisation using the coding categories listed in Table 2, 
the picture changes dramatically. Figure 1 shows the proportion (0-100%) of meetings attended by 
each of the 12 major kinds of organisation (we have ordered this data in such a way as to prevent 
double-counting in those cases where organisations from different sub-categories of the same major 
code were present at a meeting).  
Figure 1. Levels of Access Achieved by Different Kinds of Organisation (%), 2010-2015). 
% of meetings attended. 
 
 Source: constructed by authors. 
Note: the figures here relate to the % of the total of 6,292 meetings attended by each of the 12 major 
organisations coded. The total % figures for the columns do not sum to 100%. This is because in many cases 
meetings were attended by organisations from different categories: for example, business and unions. Imagine 
a situation in which there are just three meetings. One is solely with a representative from business; one is 
solely with a representative from a union; and the third is attended by both a business and a union. Business 
and the unions, on our measure, attend 66% of the meetings. 
 
In a classic contribution to political science, Charles Lindblom (1977) argued in Politics and 
Markets ƚŚĂƚ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƐ Ă  ‘ƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞĚ ? ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝĐǇ-making process in 
democratic countries. A wide body of literature has, since then, documented and sought to explain 
the varying levels of access achieved by business (Bouwen, 2004; Drope and Hansen, 2006; Yackee 
and Yackee, 2006). This focus, a perennial concern in the discipline, has gained renewed vigour since 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. As Culpepper (2016: 459) writes, summarising recent literature, 
 ‘ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ƉŽǁĞƌ ŝƐ ŽŶĐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶ ƌĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĞĨƌŽŶƚ ŽĨ ĚĞďĂƚĞƐ  ? ƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐ
emphasis from the institutional roots of political equilibria to the power resources of business and 
ƚŚĞŝƌĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
British Telecom 
58 
  
9 
 Our analysis shows that the intensity of the focus on business power continues to make 
sense for political scientists. Business organisations attended 2,694 meetings: nearly 45% of all the 
meetings held by senior ministers. Furthermore, on fully 81% of these occasions (2,195 meetings), 
business was the only kind of organisation in attendance at that meeting. High levels of access were 
secured not only by the CBI, BAE systems, Shell and British Telecom (listed in Table 3) but by the 
Virgin conglomerate (including Virgin Rail, Virgin Airways and Virgin Media) (54 meetings); The Royal 
Bank of Scotland (51 meetings); HSBC (50 meetings); Network Rail (49 meetings); the British 
Chamber of Commerce (including regional branches) (48 meetings); and Barclays Bank (47 
meetings). In addition to this, ministers held regular meetings with three other collective business 
lobbying organisations: The Institute of Directors (40 meetings); the British Bankers Association (36 
meetings); and the little-known Business Advisory Group composed of Mark Carney (Bank of 
England), Sir Roger Carr (Chairman, BAE Systems), Sir James Dyson, John Cridland (CBI) and Sir 
Andrew Witty (GSK) amongst other (13 meetings).  
 We should be wary of concluding that the high levels of access secured by business relative 
to other kinds of organisations constitutes evidence of overwhelming political influence. Businesses 
like Virgin Media and British Telecom are likely to have both shared and competing interests. The 
fact that both attend a large number of meetings with senior ministers does not mean that each will 
be able to secure its objectives. Furthermore, particular businesses sometimes attend meetings with 
ministers from a position of weakness. Between 2010 and 2015 Ministers  W particularly the Secretary 
of State for Business Innovation and Skills  W held large numbers of meetings with representatives of 
banks (sub-category 1a) including HSBC, The Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays and the British Bankers 
Association (listed above) and with Lloyds Banking Group (44 meetings) and Standard Charter (31 
meetings) ?dŚĞƐĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚŝŶĂ ‘ŶŽŝƐǇ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
banks had been shredded by the financial crisis and a succession of scandals relating to the payment 
of bonuses, the manipulation of interest-rates, the miss-selling of payment protection insurance and 
money-laundering (Culpepper, 2011). No doubt bank executives were able to use these meetings to 
remind ministers of the important position the banks continue to occupy within the British economy 
and to rehearse arguments against what they regarded as over-intrusive regulation. Yet whilst the 
fact that ministers were willing to continue to meet with bank executives rather than declaring them 
to be persona non-grata is notable, it is also significant that on a range of key policy issues  W the 
 ‘ƌŝŶŐ-ĨĞŶĐŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůĂŶĚŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨďĂŶŬƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĞůĞĐƚƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
of that ring-fence; the introduction of higher capital ratios and a new overall leverage ratio and the 
effective opt-out from the ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐŵĂǆŝŵƵŵĐĂƉŝƚĂůƌĂƚŝŽƐ Wthe government and the Bank 
of England eventually adopted positions which the largest banks had opposed (REFERENCE 
REMOVED). The fact that, in this instance, ministers held so many meetings with banks was a 
measure not of their influence but of the fact that the light-touch regulatory system they had been 
influential in promoting during the 2000s was crumbling.  
 Other than business, the two types of organisation to secure the highest levels of access 
were third sector organisations and the media. Third sector organisations attended nearly 18% of all 
meetings with ministers. Within this broad category, the largest number of meetings were attended 
by charities and cause groups (sub-category 2a) including Save the Children (40 meetings); The Royal 
Society for the Protection of Birds (31 meetings); Oxfam (also 31 meetings); Christian Aid (25 
meetings); the National Trust (also 25 meetings); The Wildlife Trust (22 meetings); Hacked-off, 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (20 meetings); and Age UK (19 meetings). In total, 
representatives from non-profit charities and cause groups attended 877 meetings with ministers 
and were present at 14% of all meetings. By contrast, representatives from churches and other 
religious organisations (sub-category 2d) secured very little access: attending less than 2% of the 
total number of meetings held between ministers and outside bodies. What is particularly 
noteworthy here, given how often ministers underlined their commitment to religious tolerance and 
support for the Muslim faith, is just how infrequently ministers met with representatives from 
Muslim organisations. Whilst the Archbishop of Canterbury alone held 14 meetings with senior 
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ministers, groups representing the Muslim community and faith collectively held only 10 meetings 
with senior ministers.  
 tŚŝůƐƚ Ɛƚŝůů ŝŶ ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐ ĂŶĚ >ŝďĞƌĂů ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ĚĞƌŝĚĞĚ >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ
ŽďƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ŶĞǁƐ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ  ‘ƐƉŝŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ŚĂďŝƚ ŽĨŐƌĂŶƚŝŶŐ ƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞĚ ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ
particularly supportive newspapers and journalists. We cannot use the data collected here to judge 
whether Coalition ministers spent less time talking to journalists and the press. What we can say is 
that ministers invested a collectively significant, although individually very different, amount of time 
in meeting with journalists. In total journalists and representatives of media organisations such as 
News International were present at 14.3% of all the meetings held by ministers. Breaking this down 
into the two sub-categories we employed, journalists, editors and the management of the BBC 
(including representatives of the BBC Trust) were present at over 2% of meetings (no doubt this 
figure includes meetings relating to the renewal of the BBC Charter) whilst journalists, editors and 
owners of private media organisations were present at 12% of meetings. The media organisations 
which secured the highest levels of access were the Daily Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph (131 
meetings), the BBC (124 meetings), The Times and Sunday Times (89 meetings), the Daily Mail and 
Mail on Sunday (62 meetings), the Evening Standard (60 meetings), ITV and ITN (55 meetings), the 
Financial Times (54 meetings) and the Sun and Sun on Sunday (49 meetings). To complete this list, 
journalists and editors from three consistently left-wing newspapers which opposed the Coalition, 
the Independent (32 meetings), Guardian (30 meetings) and Mirror (23 meetings) secured relatively 
lower levels of access as did journalists and editors from the Daily Express (20 meetings) whose 
owner and editorial team were also very critical of the Coalition. 
 ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉĞƌŝŽĚŝŶŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚďǇŽŶĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
newspaper owner, Rupert Murdoch, once again became a political story in its own right: most 
notably during a meeting of the select committee on media and culture at which Rupert Murdoch 
was cross-examined about his knowledge of phone hacking and his access to senior ministers 
 ?K ?ĂƌƌŽůůĂŶĚ,Ăůliday, 2012). Yet this is another case where the relationship between access and 
influence is unclear. Perhaps because they were reluctant to be seen to be meeting with him for fear 
of being seen to be according him too much influence, Rupert Murdoch actually only attended 11 
recorded meetings with ministers: three of these with Michael Gove, two with David Cameron, one 
with George Osborne and one with the then Secretary of State for Culture Media and Sport, Sajid 
Javid. Yet it is perhaps also notable that Murdoch attended two of David CamĞƌŽŶ ?Ɛ ĨŝƌƐƚ ƚŚƌĞĞ
meetings on the 10
th
 of May 2010. /ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ZƵƉĞƌƚDƵƌĚŽĐŚ ?ƐƐŽŶ ?:ĂŵĞƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚĂĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?
meetings at which his father was not present whilst Rebekah Brooks who was Chief Executive Officer 
of News International from 2009 to 2011 (prior to her resignation and subsequent arrest on charges 
of perverting the course of justice) attended a further 8 meetings at which neither Murdoch was 
present (5 of which were with the Prime Minister). To put this into some kind of context, Rupert 
Murdoch and other News International Executives secured a significantly higher level of access than 
representatives from a large FTSE 100 engineering company like GKN (7 meetings).  
 Beyond business, the third sector and the media, no other kind of organisation achieved 
notably significant levels of access. Representatives from other central state organisations attended 
nearly 8% of meetings. A considerable body of literature has, in recent years, pointed to the growth 
in the numbers of and the uncertain democratic credentials of quangos and other state bodies 
(REFERENCE REMOVED). Our data shows that ministers met most often with representatives from 
The Bank of England (22 meetings), the Arts Council (20 meetings), The London Organising 
Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic Games (17 meetings) and the NHS Alliance (11 
meetings). Representatives from local government attended over 3% of meetings with the highest 
level of access being secured by the Local Government Association (51 meetings). In addition, 
representatives from either foreign governmental groups (sub-category 13a) or from transnational 
bodies (sub-category 13b) were present at a total of 2.5% of meetings: most notably (in terms of the 
second of these categories) with representatives of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (15 meetings).  
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 Within the broad category of education, in total, and across sub-categories, representatives 
from the education sector attended 6.6% of meetings. Representatives from universities (3a) were 
present at 3.7% of meetings. Within this sub-category, two peak organisations, Universities UK (27 
meetings) and The Russell Group (8 meetings), secured the highest level of access. The individual 
universities with the highest level of access were the London School of Economics (16 meetings) and 
Imperial College (13 meetings). The individual named academics who attended the largest number 
of meetings were the economist and Professor Energy Policy at Oxford, Dieter Helm (4 meetings) 
and the local government expert at the London School of Economics, Tony Travers (4 meetings).  
 Given the influence sometimes accorded to them by political scientists and the pride they 
take in having high-level contacts and offering tailored policy advice, it is striking that think-tanks 
were present at less than 3% of meetings. The think-tanks which achieved the highest levels of 
access were those specialising in particular areas of policy: The Sutton Trust (education policy) (13 
ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ ?ĂŶĚdŚĞ<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ&ƵŶĚ(health) (11 meetings). Despite only having been established in 2008, 
representatives from the Institute for Government also achieved a significant level of access (11 
meetings). It is also notable in this respect that three think-tanks closely associated with the 
Conservative Party and, more generally, the development of neoliberalism, the Adam Smith Institute 
(0 meetings), the Centre for Policy Studies (3 meetings) and the Centre for Social Justice (3 meetings) 
secured relatively low levels of access. 
 Representatives from unions attended 304 meetings with ministers and were present at 
fewer than 5% of all meetings. What is perhaps most notable in this respect, is the relatively high 
level of access secured by the Trades Union Congress (82 meetings). The only other traditional trade 
union which secured relatively high levels of access was Unite (28 meetings). By contrast, the GMB, 
which has over 600,000 members, only attended 6 meetings whilst USDAW, The Union of Shop, 
Distributive and Allied Workers, which has over 400,000 members, attended no meetings. The two 
other organisations which we classified as unions because they exist primarily to protect their 
ŵĞŵďĞƌ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐĞĐƵƌĞd relatively high levels of access were the National Farmers 
Union (NFU) (52 meetings) and the British Medical Association (24 meetings). Overall, whilst trade 
unions were not cast into the political wilderness during the Coalition years, it is notable that 
professional associations were able to secure an equivalent level of access. 
In regards to individual access, there are some notable findings. The data here is, perhaps, 
less informative as civil servants are under no obligation to record when a meeting with an 
organisation is attended by a single individual. This means that it is eminently possible that a 
meeting could be coded as either with Tata Steel or with Ratan Tata (the company owner). These 
differences can distort the data and make it important not to draw too many conclusions. What is 
perhaps most notable is that whilst famous individuals such as TV chef Jamie Oliver, Nicola Roberts 
from Girls Aloud and author Hilary Mantel did gain access to ministers, their contact was limited to a 
single meeting. Relatively few individuals met with ministers on more than one occasion. The 
notable exceptions to this general rule are the former Prime Minister Tony Blair (4 meetings) and 
Rosa Monckton (a business woman and charity campaigner with extensive links to the 
establishment) (3 meetings). The property developer and Conservative Party donor Nick Candy was 
also present at 3 meetings whilst Gerry and Kate McCann met with Teresa May twice. These findings 
suggest that individuals are granted less access than collective organisations, suggesting that the 
power of celebrity may not be as influential as sometimes claimed. 
 
 
3. Meetings Across Government Departments: The Salience of Resource Dependency 
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In describing patterns of access, we have, so far, treated government as the relevant unit-of-
analysis: looking at patterns of access across all government departments. Yet it has always been an 
important part of the pluralist account of interest-group politics that patterns of access are likely to 
vary significantly from one part of government to another; that organisations or types of 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞĂĐĐŽƌĚĞĚ ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐŝŶŽŶĞƉĂƌƚŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚĂƐ
 ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌƐ ? ĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ƵŶŝƚ-of-analysis for the study of, for example, policy 
networks is therefore the departmental or sub-departmental level (Richardson et al., 1978; Smith et 
al., 1993). In this manner, McFarland (1987: 133) ŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐƚĞŶĚƐƚŽďĞĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĞĚ
into decision-making in various specific policy areas, which are normally controlled by special-
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? Different departments of government are characterised by distinct resource 
dependencies and exchange relationships (Marin and Mayntz, 1991), and therefore political 
ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐƐŚŽƵůĚĞǆƉĞĐƚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ‘ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? 
 Given these ideas it is informative to consider whether patterns of access vary across 
government and whether there is support for the idea that different policy areas are dominated by 
different groups. To see whether and to what extent patterns of access vary from one department to 
another, Figure 2 shows the % of meetings attended by the kinds of organisation with, overall, the 
highest level of access, business, the third sector and the media, on a department-by-department 
basis in the order in which they were first presented in Table 1.  
 In analysing the results, it makes sense to start with business: which, as we have seen, 
attended nearly 45% of all meetings between ministers and outside interests. There are a number of 
departments  W including Energy (72% of all meetings), Transport (69%), Business, Innovation and 
Skills (68%), The Treasury (65%), Defence (55%), the Cabinet Office (56%) and The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (50%) where business is present at more than 50% of all meetings. There is 
however some diversity in representation here. There are seven departments (the Home Office, 
Communities and Local Government, Education, Overseas Development, Work and Pensions, Health 
and Justice) in which a kind of organisation other than business is present at the largest number of 
meetings. Indeed, there are a number of departments in which business is present at a relatively low 
proportion of meetings: including Education and the Home Office (15% of all meetings), the Ministry 
of Justice (16%) and Health (19% of all meetings).  ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŵĂǇ ?ŽǀĞƌĂůů ?ĞŶũŽǇĂ ‘ƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞĚ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ
within the policy-making process but its access is not uniform. 
Third sector organisations  W which, as previously noted, include charities and cause groups, 
social enterprises, co-operatives and religious groups as distinct sub-categories  W achieve the highest 
levels of access in The Department of Work and Pensions (50% of all meetings), Overseas 
Development (48%) and the Home Office (30%) and the lowest levels of access in the Treasury (3%) 
and Department of Defence (5%). Finally, there are also significant variations in the attention 
ministers devote to meetings with journalists. The Prime Minister (37% of all meetings), the Deputy 
Prime Minister (23%), the Secretary of State for Defence (24%) and the Chancellor (21%) hold the 
largest number of meetings with journalists. At the other end of this scale, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the Secretaries of State for Energy (2% of all meetings), the Environment (2%) and 
Transport (5%) do not meet as regularly with journalists because these are, for the most part, 
politically less high profile departments. It is however perhaps more noteworthy that the Home 
Secretary (Theresa May throughout this period) (8% of all meetings) and the Secretary of State for 
Health (4%) should also have largely eschewed devoting large parts of their diary to meetings with 
journalists.  
 
Figure 2: Levels of Access Achieved by Business, Third Sector and Media in Departments (% of total 
meetings attended) 
  
13 
 
Source: Constructed by authors 
 
 Looking across a broader range of organisational categories, we have identified four further 
instances of significant diversity in access. First, whilst think-tanks were present at only 4% of 
meetings, they were present at 11% of the meetings held by the Deputy Prime Minister. Second, 
whilst trade unions were present at only 5% of all meetings, they were present for fully 16% of the 
meetings held by the Secretary of State for the Environment and 14% of the meetings held by The 
Secretary of State for Education (despite the overt hostility of Michael Gove - who was Secretary of 
State between 2010 and 2014 - to the teaching unions). Third, while representatives of local 
government were present at only 3% of all meetings, it is not surprising that they were present at 
fully 32% of the meetings held by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. 
Finally, whilst professional associations were only present at 4.6% of all meetings, within the 
Ministry of Justice, they attended 39% of meetings (with representatives of the Bar Council and the 
Law Society each attending 18% of meetings). 
Digging further into this data it is possible to identify differences in the levels of access 
achieved by individual organisations and, at times, levels of access which are consistent with the 
existence of policy communities characterised by ƚŚĞ ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ŚŝŐŚ-quality 
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŐƌŽƵƉƐĂŶĚĂĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽƌƐƵď-departmental unit (Marsh 
and Rhodes, 1992). First, within the Department for Environment, Food and Rural affairs the 
National Farmers Union was present at 49 meetings (16.3% of all meetings). This is compared with 
just 3 other meetings the NFU held with ministers in other parts of the government. To effectively 
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ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞE&hƐƚŝůůƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞƐĂƐƚŚĞƋƵŝŶƚĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂŶ  ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?
group, this level of access need to be compared with that achieved by potentially rival groups 
representing the interests of retailers and supermarkets or environmentalists. The Food and Drink 
Federation and the British Retail Consortium were present at, respectively, 14 and 13 meetings. 
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the Campaign to Protect Rural England were only invited to 
attend 13 meetings in total and between them. Even the National Trust  W traditionally regarded as 
the exemplar of environmental respectability  W only attended 10 meetings with the Secretary-of-
State. Second, at the Department for International Development, the large aid organisations are 
accorded high levels of access: often being invited to attend the same meetings. Action Aid, Save the 
Children, The Gates Foundation, Christian Aid and Oxfam attended 41 meetings with the Secretary 
of State (15% of all meetings). By contrast, the World Bank  W a key international organisation with a 
development mandate  W was only present at 3 meetings: once again suggesting that access is not 
evenly distributed. Finally, the defence, security and aerospace company BAE systems, which was 
identified in Table 3 as one of the organisations with the highest overall levels of access to 
government, attending 19 meetings with the Secretary of State for Defence (18% of all recorded 
meetings). In contrast, large US-based arms manufacturers like Boeing (3 meetings) and General 
Dynamics (1 meeting), with which BAE regularly competes for defence contracts, do not appear in as 
many meetings. Again, comparing these internal findings with variation across departments it 
appears that a company like BAE is not uniformly dominant. Whilst influential within Defence, BAE 
only had 7 meetings in the Department of Business Innovation and Skills and with the Prime 
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ KĨĨŝĐĞ ?  ?meetings in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 2 meetings with the 
Department of Education and Skills. Looking in more detail at this data it therefore appears that 
whilst classes of organisation such as business can be seen to have access across government, the 
precise access secured varies across department and there is significant variation in which specific 
organisations gain that access 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In reporting on this data on access to ministers between 2010 and 2015, we have not attempted to 
test particular hypotheses or arguments about the nature of interest-group representation. Rather, 
we have presented and begun to demonstrate the insights from our newly-constructed and now 
available dataset of over 6,000 ministerial meetings. In reporting our findings, it appears that this 
work does, however, speak to established debates within the political science literature. In 
particular, it resonates with work on the distribution of power within the state, specifically the 
power of business, and work which highlights variations in access (and potentially influence) across 
departments. Our data has consistently shown that certain types of organisation gain far higher 
levels of access than others when we consider government as a whole. Whilst there are variations 
within departments it appears that businesses, alongside the media and third sector organisations, 
gain considerably more access than think tanks, other governmental bodies or individuals. 
When compared against the EU Integrity Watch database, there are clear parallels that support our 
findings. Analysis of the 2014- ? ? :ƵŶĐŬĞƌ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ƐŚŽǁƐ  ‘ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ? ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞ to a 
similar extent as in our dataset. Corporate actors make up nearly 75% of organisations attending 
more than 5 meetings with European Commissioners, since the beginning of the Juncker 
Commission. Of the top 10 groups attending the most meetings, Corporate actors again 
predominate, taking up 6 out of the top 10 places, with key organisations including Google, 
Microsoft, BUSINESSEUROPE and DIGITAL EUROPE. NGOs such as Greenpeace and the World 
Wildlife Fund take up the remaining spots. This replication of corporate dominance of meetings with 
Commissioners adds validity to our findings, but there are also interesting points of difference for 
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potential comparison. The media, for example, do not feature at the EU level to a great extent (they 
are not coded as a single group in the Integrity Watch database), whereas they represent a 
significant group at the UK level. The similarities and differences between our dataset and EU level 
data provide significant potential for comparative analysis.  
In terms of existing scholarly research, placed in the context of debates around corporatism, policy 
networks and pluralist theories of power, our findings suggeƐƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƉŽǁĞƌ ŝƐ ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ
than dispersed ? ?ZŝĐŚĂƌĚƐĂŶĚ^ŵŝƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? P 173) and ƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇĞůŝƚĞƐǁŚŽ ‘ƚŽƐŽŵĞ
degree exercise power or influence over the actors in the system' (Dahl, 1958: 463).  The high levels 
of access secured by groups like the NFU within the Department for the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs and BAE within the Ministry of Defence suggest the significance of certain organisations 
for departments tasked with developing and implementing complex agendas. Our data also reveals 
that these organisations do not however achieve access across the governmental landscape, 
appearing to support pluralised elite theories of power (McFarland, 1987, Christiansen and Dowding, 
1994). The CBI is the only organisation which secures consistently high levels of access across a range 
of different departments. The requirements and dependencies of specific departments in their 
policy areas seemed to tie in with the groups ministers met with. Further research is, of course, 
needed to examine the substance of these meetings and the influence exerted through such 
interactions to gain a fuller understanding of the significance of this finding. And yet, we argue that 
this data provides a fruitful foundation for exploring the role of business and the relative distribution 
of meetings within different departments. 
Turning more generally to consider the insights this data holds for debates about interest groups and 
lobbying, it is interesting that our data does not confirm a widely-diagnosed shift in interest 
representation. Numerous scholars have diagnosed the growing significance of professional 
lobbyists, new forms of group mobilisation  W often linked to social movements - the Europeanization 
of representation (Moran, 2015: 97) and the growth of international pressure groups (Richards and 
Smith, 2002: 190-191). Whilst our coding framework was not developed explicitly to test this 
proposition, our data demonstrates surprisingly little evidence of these trends. Our attempts to code 
for professional lobbying organisations produced no results, suggesting that these organisations may 
not be as significant as proposed when considering ministerial meetings. The rise of social 
movements was, to some extent, picked-up in our coding of third sector organisations where groups 
such as Citizens UK (6 meetings), 38 degrees (2 meetings) and Unlock Democracy (1 meeting) did 
gain access, but this was more limited than access gained by more familiar interest groups such as 
Greenpeace or the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. Finally, the emphasis on international 
and European organisations is particularly interesting. The existing literature emphasises the 
growing significance of international bodies such as the European Union or World Bank and 
emphasises the growth of new interest groups that target these transnational organisations 
(Richards and Smith, 2002). From our data, it is not possible to disaggregate internationally from 
domestically focusing organisations, but it is possible to note that relatively few international bodies 
themselves gained meetings with ministers. Only 152 meetings were coded as being with foreign 
governmental bodies or transnational non-governmental bodies. This suggests that whilst the 
international arena may provide a new platform for interest groups, those same forums are not 
regularly utilising meetings with ministers to attempt to secure influence over domestic politics.  
This database accordingly opens the door to a rich array of questions concerning the relationship 
between different organisations and the state. Our initial descriptive overview is intended to 
encourage other scholars to mine and explore this data with a view to casting new light on debates 
around corporatism, elitism, pluralism, policy networks and much else. Paired with detailed 
qualitative analysis or used to facilitate historical, comparative analysis this data therefore offers a 
new resource for researchers interested in the intersection between the state, interests and political 
governance.  
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i
 Transparency International UK has published the details of meetings held by ministers over a three-month 
period between April and June 2014. This has been published by Transparency Matters (see 
http://transparencymatters.transparency.org.uk/). The organisation tŚŽ ?Ɛ>ŽďďǇŝŶŐ has also collated and 
published departmental records of meetings (see http://whoslobbying.com/uk/departments). 
ii
 The coding process was multi-levelled to ensure the reliability of findings. Having devised the coding scheme 
the authors test-coded one department and compared their findings to refine the coding scheme and ensure 
consistency. Six paid researchers (all PhD students in politics) were then recruited to code the data. All coders 
initially coded the test department and were only allowed to code individual departments once they had 
coded with less than a 5% margin of error as checked by the primary researchers. Upon completion of the 
initial coding the authors then checked 10% of each department to ensure reliability. Where multiple errors 
were found, entire departments were re-coded by an author. 
